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Implementation of an Industrial
Siting Plan
By WILLIAM G. MURRAY, JR.*
CARL J. SENEKER II**
All parties involved in site determination for a major industrial
facility face the problem that such facilities may be unattractive and
may create noises, odors, and other emissions. At the same time, how-
ever, a major industrial facility produces valuable commodities and
creates jobs, an increased tax base, and economic stability for the com-
munity in which it is located. As a result of these competing concerns,
every time such a facility is proposed, finding the most desirable loca-
tion for that facility evokes deep-seated emotional support and opposi-
tion. This Article suggests, in practical terms, how public siting
decisions might best be made under such circumstances.1
An example of how industrial siting decisions should not be made
recently was provided by the Sohio Petroleum Terminal and Pipeline
Project. 2 The Sohio project originally was conceived in 1974. The So-
hio company immediately began consulting with a large number of en-
vironmental and governmental groups to determine the best site for
such a facility. In 1975, after environmental studies had been per-
formed by the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the Port of Long
Beach was chosen as the most desirable site for the facility.3 A dispute
immediately arose over the designation of the lead agency which,
* A.B., 1972, Utah State University; J.D., 1975, University of California. Member,
California State Bar.
** A.B., 1964, Stanford University; J.D., 1967, University of California, Berkeley.
Member, California State Bar. This Article originally was prepared for and presented at a
seminar sponsored by the Lincoln Institute for Land Policy, held on February 8 and 9, 1980.
1. The authors previously reviewed the background for industrial siting problems and
certain general criteria relating to a number of proposals for industrial siting reform in Mur-
ray & Seneker, Industrial Siting: Allocating the Burden of Pollution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 301
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Industrial Siting].
2. See 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 13-14 (1979); 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2099-2100, 2135,
2386-87 (1979); 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 691-92, 1309 (1978).
3. Address by Charles E. Greenberg, Energy Law Symposium at Loyola Law School
at 5 (Mar. 13, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg Address] (on file with The Hastings Law
Journal).
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under the California Environmental Quality Act 4 (CEQA), would pre-
pare the environmental impact report 5 (EIR). After substantial negoti-
ation, the Public Utilities Commission and the Port of Long Beach
were chosen to serve jointly as lead agencies in the preparation of the
EIR. This decision, however, subsequently was attacked by numerous
groups opposing the project and resulted in extensive litigation.6 The
Sohio project also was caught in cross-fire between the California
Coastal Commission, which wanted certain additional storage tanks lo-
cated inland, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District,
which viewed the inland location of these tanks as likely to cause more
air pollution from the generation of the electricity required to pump oil
inland.
7
The problems with the Sohio project decisionmaking process were
noted in a prophetic statement by Charles E. Greenberg in an address
to an energy law symposium at Loyola Law School on March 3, 1979:
The truth is that the economics of the Sohio Project are rapidly ap-
proaching a critical stage. If the Sohio project does not receive its
required permits within the near future, there is no economic justifi-
cation for the company constructing it. Yet, I predict that, if a year
from now, for instance, the company abandons the project, it will be
accused of having wasted inordinate amounts of time of inordinate
numbers of government officials and studiers for some nefarious oil
industry purpose. If this occurs, instead of blaming Sohio, perhaps it
would be more constructive to look at our government permitting
process. That process should make it possible, within what would
then be a six-year period, to obtain permits for two berths in a port
containing many other berths, eight oil tanks in an area containing
thousands of oil tanks, and one pipeline in an area presently criss-
crossed by existing underground pipelines. If six years is not enough
time, we are truly in great trouble. The basic reason we would be in
great trouble is that, while the average Californian won't know
enough of the technical details of the project to understand why the
governmental processes broke down, his instincts will tell him that
the final test of the workability of any governmental system is its
ability to make decisions. If decisions can't be made within reason-
able times, he knows there is something fundamentally wrong.
8
In March of 1979, Sohio announced that it was withdrawing its plans
4. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
5. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 1977).
6. Utter v. City of Long Beach Board of Harbor Commissioners, No. SOC 51445
(Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, CA, July 6, 1978); Citizens Task Force on Sohio v. Board
of Harbor Commissioners, No. SOC 50044 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles County, CA, Mar. 9,
1978); Citizens Task Force on Sohio v. Public Utilities Commission, No. SF 23986 (Super.
Ct. San Francisco County, CA).
7. Greenberg Address, supra note 3, at 9.
8. Id. at 12-13.
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for constructing its Long Beach terminal facility and the pipeline. Pub-
lic outcry over this decision was tumultuous, spreading from Long
Beach to Los Angeles to Sacramento, and finally to Washington, D.C.,
where presidential dispensation of certain air quality standards was
sought.9 This outcry, and the subsequent attempt to circumvent envi-
ronmental statutes, does not represent a positive step in public deci-
sionmaking.
Arguably, Sohio's failure to secure the requisite permits was itself
a decision by default, in effect a negative decision and indeed one rep-
resentative of careful public decisionmaking. The position taken in this
Article, however, is that the preferable system is one in which actual
decisions are rendered rather than determined by attrition, assuming
such a system can be achieved.
This Article discusses ways in which the decisionmaking process
for major industrial facilities can be improved. The first section of the
Article discusses the need for a master siting agency and a one-stop
siting process.10 The second section discusses who should make indus-
trial siting decisions,II focusing on the need to have the decision made
by those who will best represent public opinion. The third section con-
siders the problems inherent in the conflict between state and local con-
trol.' 2 Fourth, the Article reviews and rejects the concept of a master
industrial siting plan.13 Finally, the fifth section proposes specific pro-
cedures that should govern an industrial siting commission.
14
One-Stop Decisionmaking
The goal of the industrial siting proposal espoused in this Article is
to devise a system that will enable siting decisions to be made within a
specified, reasonable period of time. We view this as the acid test of
public decisionmaking; namely, that after a specified period of time, a
decision is made upon which the involved parties can rely. A one-stop,
master siting agency offers the best chance to achieve this goal.
The creation of another bureaucratic agency is not something to be
taken lightly. The history of environmental and land use legislation
makes one skeptical that such a master agency could accomplish any-
9. See H.R. 3243, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 2386-87
(1979).
10. See notes 15-28 & accompanying text infra.
I1. See notes 29-30 & accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 31-46 & accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 47-51 & accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 52-65 & accompanying text infra.
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thing except create another hurdle in the path of the construction of an
industrial facility.15 Indeed, the most ardent supporter of siting legisla-
tion may be the perceptive opponent of industrial expansion, perceiv-
ing a new agency as yet another forum in which protracted hearings
can be scheduled and from which appeals can be taken. The present
proposal, however, is designed to avoid these pitfalls.
A master permitting agency has not been a uniformily accepted
concept. 16 As noted in our previous Article, there has been vigorous
opposition to a master agency by those supporting local control.17 Op-
ponents of industrial expansion may rightly complain that a one-stop
system unduly favors industrial interests who can offer the enticing car-
rot of economic prosperity, while the opponents of expansion are left
arguing the long term and less tangible benefits of conservation and
environmental preservation. The merits of this argument, however, are
dependent on a number of related factors, including the make-up of the
siting agency and the legal standards under which it must proceed. In
any event, concern over unwarranted industrial expansion does not
outweigh the disadvantages created by a system which fragments deci-
sionmaking and diffuses accountability. The overriding argument in
favor of radical change is that the present system has not been able to
arrive at decisions within a reasonable period of time. 18
Charles E. Greenberg commented on the present system's inability
to arrive at timely decisions, and the consequences thereof, in his recent
address to the Energy Law Symposium at Loyola Law School:
After the '73 crisis, most nations with undeveloped oil resources
quickly developed them. England, for example, identified, explored,
developed, produced, and is now efficiently bringing to market its
offshore North Sea oil. As early as 1969, we enjoyed a gigantic head-
start on the English-we had, prior to that time, already explored
and discovered our North Slope Alaskan oil. When our permitting
system broke down, Congressional action in 1968 and 1974 approved
the construction of the Alaskan Pipeline. The only task remaining
15. A review of federal and California environmental and land use legislation relating
to industrial siting is contained in Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 305-18.
16. F. BOSSELMAN, D. FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT ExPLOSION-CooRDINA-
TION OF THE PROLIFERATION 59-60 (1976); OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, URBAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR CALIFORNIA, REVIEW DRAFT 70
(1977). See Deal, The Durham Controversy. Energy Facility Siting and the Land Use Plan-
ning Control Process, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 437 (1975). See also Industrial Siting, supra
note 1, at 318-19.
17. See Industrial Siting, supra note I, at 318-19.
18. The most notorious examples of these problems in the western United States have
been the Sohio project, discussed at notes 2-9 & accompanying text supra, and the Dow and
Kaiparowits projects, considered in Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 301-02.
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was to approve and construct an efficient way to bring Alaskan oil to
market in the lower 48 states.
Yet England, a country supposedly bedeviled by government
bureaucracy and inefficiency, has completed its entire North Sea pro-
gram while we are still enmeshed in a permitting maze for accom-
plishing one comparatively simple decision-where to land Alaskan
oil on the West Coast and construct a pipeline from the West Coast
to Middle America. Even if we approved the Sohio project today, it
would still be 1981 or 1982 before the system could be constructed
and put into operation-almost a decade since the Arab oil boycott.
In the field of natural gas, both the United States and Japan,
immediately after '73, began plans to contract for-and bring to mar-
ket natural gas in a liquid state-LNG. Japan has conceived, per-
mitted, built and placed into operation its LNG facilities. California
is still arguing about the ideal best site for its first facility. Special
legislation adopted over a year ago has not as yet been successful in
accomplishing the identification and approval of our first LNG pro-
ject. Yet, even if we approve an LNG site tomorrow, it would be a
decade from the boycott before the facility could be constructed and
put into operation.' 9
Significantly, recent major industrial projects in the West, such as the
Kaiparowits project in Utah,20 the Dow project in the San Francisco
Bay Area,21 and the Sohio project in Southern California,22 have not
died so much from negative environmental decisions as from the pon-
derous burden imposed by regulatory delay and protracted appeals.
Based on this history, one-stop siting by a master permitting agency
offers an attractive alternative to the present fragmented, often self-de-
feating system.
Even assuming the adoption of a statute that allows one-stop sit-
ing, substantial opposition to statutory implementation can be expected
from local governmental agencies. Our previous Article held out hope
for a new industrial siting statute then recently enacted in Wyoming
23
as an example of one-stop siting.24 In practice, however, that statute
has not lived up to its initial promise as an example of one-stop siting.
The Wyoming Industrial Siting Commission does a laudable job in
moving proposals through the existing regulatory framework and in
19. Greenberg Address, supra note 3, at 2-4.
20. Southern California Edison Co., Press Release (Apr. 14, 1976).
21. Dow Chemical Corp., Press Release (Jan. 19, 1977).
22. See notes 2-9 & accompanying text supra.
23. Industrial Development Information and Siting Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-12-101 to
121 (1977).
24. See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 325-28; Van Baalen, Industrial Siting Legisla-
lion: The Wyoming Industrial Development Information and Siting Act-Adance or Re-
treat?, 11 LAND & WATER L. Rnv. 27 (1976).
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speeding up the siting procedure in that state.25 The Commission, how-
ever, leaves the most crucial environmental questions to the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality.26 Thus, although the Wyoming
Act may help to coordinate the procedure for siting a major facility, the
Act does not do as much as it could and does not seem to provide the
answer for a major industrial state. In this respect, the Act has taken
on more of the attributes of a clearinghouse statute similar to the one in
effect in Washington.27
The issue of state versus local control is always one of the most
difficult to resolve. By definition, however, projects which would come
under the jurisdiction of the siting proposal discussed in this Article
will have a regional or statewide impact.28 Given this fact, it seems
illogical to vest life or death control of a project in any agency which
has only a limited jurisdiction or a limited constituency. The only via-
ble alternative to the present gauntlet of single-purpose agencies is to
vest a master siting agency with the authority to override the decisions
of such agencies when making a siting decision.
Who Decides
The decisionmaking body of the siting agency, the "siting commis-
sion," should be made up of individuals appointed by the governor and
approved by the legislature. Such individuals should serve for stag-
gered terms so that they might represent a balance of political factions.
The alternate approach of having the siting commission appointed on
an ex officio basis by representatives of various state agencies and inter-
est groups is here rejected, on the ground that to the greatest extent
possible commission members should not have allegiances to special
interest groups.
The question of who should make siting decisions also raises the
issues of what type of review the siting commission's decisions should
be subject to and how an accurate picture of public sentiment can be
reflected in siting decisions. The controlling principle in deciding who
should make resource allocation decisions should be the need to estab-
25. This statement is based on the authors' conversations with Dr. Blaine Dinger, Exec-
utive Director, Wyoming Industrial Siting Commission, and on a review by the authors of
the rules of the Wyoming Industrial Siting Commission.
26. Conversations with Dr. Blaine Dinger, Executive Director, Wyoming Industrial
Siting Commission.
27. Environmental Coordination Procedures Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 80.50.010 to
.902 (Supp. 1978).
28. See notes 61-64 & accompanying text infra.
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lish a balanced perspective. The decision should be made by those who
are most responsive to the broad statewide and regional impact of a
siting proposal without being unresponsive to local needs and concerns.
This conclusion is not based on a belief that such individuals necessar-
ily will make the best decision, but rather on the view that the use of
natural resources is a public decision.
Judicial determination of siting issues is the antithesis of this prin-
ciple of political, economic, and social responsiveness. By resorting to
the judiciary for a siting determination, a complex resource balancing
question is placed in the hands of one or more individuals who have no
particular expertise in the field of siting and who themselves may not
be affected by the decision. In addition, the delay created by numerous
drawn out appeals can be the death knell for a project.29 Thus, a cen-
tral goal of the one-stop siting proposal espoused in this Article is to
limit severely opportunities for judicial recourse.
A simple means of restricting judicial intervention in the siting
process perhaps would be to put each siting decision to a statewide or
regional vote after study and recommendations by a siting commission.
While this proposal may be appealing in its simplicity, it has the disad-
vantages of causing delays, limiting the practical power of the siting
agency, affording undue influence to those who have substantial
financial resources to favor or oppose the siting proposal, and possibly
of not giving an adequate voice to local interests.
A better proposal may be to require legislative approval or confir-
mation of major industrial siting decisions. Assuming that a satisfac-
tory definition of a "major" decision is obtained,30 such a procedure
not only would have the advantage of limiting review to officials
elected to represent the public, who therefore should be responsive to
the public will, but also would avoid the complexities of submitting the
issue to the ballot. Such a proposal would have the additional advan-
tage of giving localities a stronger voice through their elected represent-
atives. Finally, the required legislative action would be free from
judicial scrutiny, except on constitutional grounds. On the other hand,
a flaw of this proposal may be its inability to overcome parochial inter-
ests. Moreover, removal of resource issues to the political arena may
29. The Kaiparowits and Dow projects provide perfect examples of the lethal effect
such delays can have on industrial siting projects. See notes 20-21 & accompanying text
supra.
30. It is assumed that a major decision would be one which would grant or deny the
siting of an industrial facility with regional or statewide impact. Industrial Siting, supra note
1, at 325-28. See notes 61-64 & accompanying text infra.
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produce inconsistency in action and philosophy. As set forth below,
this Article's proposal advocates a modified form of legislative ap-
proval.
The Role of Local Resource Agencies
One of the major practical obstacles to one-stop siting is the result-
ing loss of control over industrial siting suffered by local governmental
bodies, such as planning commissions, city councils, local agency for-
mation commissions, special districts, and others.3 1 Admittedly, the
type of industrial facilities discussed here have more than a local im-
pact, but their effects, both positive and negative, are felt most heavily
and directly in the immediate area in which they are located.32 The
only feasible way to address this problem, assuming the necessity for
one-stop siting, is to allow local governmental agencies and other single
resource agencies to hold advisory hearings on particular proposals and
to make recommendations, including suggested conditions on the con-
struction of a facility, to the industrial siting commission.33 This view
is in accord with the views stated in the American Bar Association's
Final Report by the Special Committee on Environmental Law. 34 This
approach would eliminate any right of appeal from the recommenda-
tions of such bodies and would bind the siting commission to these
recommendations unless the commission found that public necessity
and convenience required a contrary determination.
35
The key point in this system is that if the siting commission found
that public necessity and convenience required a contrary determina-
tion, it would be able to authorize or prevent the siting notwithstanding
the opposition of a particular local or single resource agency. A similar
provision is found in the enabling statute of the California Energy
Commission.
36
This consultation procedure for local and governmental resource
agencies would not, however, encompass or supercede the responsibil-
31. Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 314-18.
32. See generally Deal, The Durham Controversy.- Energy Facility Siting and the Land
Use Planning and Control Process, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 437 (1975).
33. Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 331-33.
34. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LEGAL
REFORMS TO FACILITATE INDUSTRIAL SITE SELECTION, FINAL REPORT BY THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 46-47 (1974).
35. This procedure is somewhat similar to that mandated under the California State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25506-
25510 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980).
36. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25514 (West Supp. 1980).
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ity of the state under federal regulatory statutes such as the Clean Air
Act37 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.38 Nevertheless, be-
cause state and local siting decisions potentially can conflict with fed-
eral mandates such as these, the siting process must provide for
accommodation of federal requirements. A major, albeit as yet un-
tested, step in facilitating the integration of air and water pollution con-
trol requirements into the siting process was made by the Air Resources
Board and the California Energy Commission in their Joint Policy
Statement of Compliance with Air Quality Laws by New Power Plants,
issued January 23, 1979.39 The Joint Policy Statement, which outlines
steps for coordinating the siting procedures of the California Energy
Commission with the air quality compliance procedures administered
by the state Air Resources Board and local air pollution control dis-
tricts under the Clean Air Act,40 provides-in pertinent part:
If the noncompliance cannot be corrected or eliminated, the [Califor-
nia Energy] Commission shall determine whether the facility is re-
quired for the public convenience and necessity and whether there
are not more prudent and feasible means of achieving such public
convenience and necessity. Only when such determination is made
and the proposed facility will meet all provisions and schedules re-
quired by the Clean Air Act, may the Commission certify the pro-
posed new facility. When certifying a facility under such conditions
the Commission shall require compliance with all applicable air
quality requirements that can be met.
41
Thus, when the more restrictive provisions of the California Air Re-
sources Board or local air pollution control districts cannot be com-
plied with, but the requirements of the Clean Air Act can be met, the
Energy Commission will have the ability to override these other local
or state agencies in deciding where to locate power plant facilities.42
This is a major step in facilitating the location of power plants while
simultaneously maintaining the requirements of the Clean Air Act.
43
Similar steps could be used in integrating the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act44 requirements and other federal legislation or regulations
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
38. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
39. Air Resources Board-California Energy Commission, Joint Policy Statement of
Compliance with Air Quality Laws by New Power Plants (1979) (on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
41. Air Resources Board-California Energy Commission, Joint Policy Statement of
Compliance with Air Quality Laws by New Power Plarits 6 (1979) (on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
42. Id. at 4.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
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that may impact a project 45 into the siting of major industrial facili-
ties. 46
Planning
Our previous Article focused on the planning process as a step in
facilitating industrial siting.47 Having reconsidered that position, this
Article views a statewide industrial siting plan as unnecessary and as a
possible obstacle to effective siting decisions. There are two reasons for
this reconsideration. First, such a plan has the potential for becoming a
bureaucractic nightmare. Years of time and effort could be spent in
developing the plan; during this period industrial siting would be in
limbo. This is not to say that the industrial siting commission does not
need guidance in making its siting decisions. Rather, such guidance
can better take the form of general guidelines or criteria designated by
the legislature in the industrial siting legislation. These criteria may or
may not be mandatory; some may only be advisory for the siting com-
mission.
Examples of potential criteria include a preference for facilities
that would preserve prime agricultural land, use land already desig-
nated for heavy industry by local planning and zoning ordinances, be
serviced by existing transportation systems, not require additional
water or sewer capacity at taxpayer expense, avoid adverse impact on
environmentally sensitive areas, minimize impact on existing resources
of clean air and water, promote economic stability in urban areas,
make maximum use of existing and potential port facilities, and inter-
nalize to the greatest extent possible any adverse environmental effects
of the facility. Admittedly, these goals are general and may be contra-
dictory as applied to a specific facility; the purpose of the criteria, how-
ever, is simply to give the siting commission a broad picture of how
industrial development should proceed.
The second reason for this Article's rejection of a statewide indus-
trial siting plan is based on the argument propounded by Charles E.
Greenberg that identifying the "best" sites is a futile task given rapidly
changing technology.48 Hence the marketplace, rather than rounds of
deliberations by local or regional governmental bodies, may provide
45. See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 305-14.
46. There is, of course, no way to avoid compliance with the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978), except by federal legislation.
47. See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 319-25.
48. Greenberg Address, supra note 3, at 4.
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better information for choosing a site. This conclusion does not elimi-
nate the necessity for the legislature to develop broad criteria regarding
how industrial development should proceed. Instead, these criteria,
once enacted, actually would be incorporated in the market forces at
work. Reliance on the marketplace as a determining factor is depen-
dent upon a continued effort by local, state, and regional governmental
officials to force industries to internalize the environmental costs of
each facility.49 Once these costs are internalized, ie., once the price of
a site facility reflects its impact on the environment, market forces can
indeed suggest the preferable sites.
In moving away from comprehensive planning, there is no intent
to discourage or in any way denigrate those laudable planning efforts
that have been made in this area, many of which can be harmonized in
an industrial siting proposal. Notable among these is the industrial sit-
ing inventory contained in the Industrial Siting Pilot Project prepared
by the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG).50 This inven-
tory includes a listing of industrially zoned sites in excess of five acres,
along with information for each site regarding population patterns,
housing, wastewater treatment potential, water availability, transporta-
tion, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
considerations, fish, wildlife, and vegetation, and other pertinent
data.51 Indeed, the ABAG project does a laudable job of designating
criteria that may be important in identifying potential industrial sites.
This type of inventory can be used by industries looking for locations
for major industrial facilities to review the environmental problems in
any particular location and to identify those locations that will best be
able to support the facility contemplated. In addition, a siting inven-
tory provides a data base from which regulatory bodies can determine
both the impact of a facility and possible ways in which that impact can
be internalized or otherwise mitigated. Industrial siting legislation
should encourage or require regional governmental bodies to prepare
inventories as an adjunct to an industrial siting program. Such inven-
tories, however, should be advisory only.
49. See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 322-25. Certain sites thus would become un-
economical because the environmental compliance costs of using such sites would be too
expensive.
50. ASSOCIATION OF BAY AREA GOVERNMENTS, INDUSTRIAL SITING PILOT PROJECT
FINAL REPORT at app. A (1978).
51. Id.
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The Process
The ABAG Industrial Siting Pilot Project52 identified six major
concerns relating to the industrial siting process: (1) centralized infor-
mation relating to regulatory agencies and their permits; (2) coordina-
tion of agencies; (3) clarification of regulations, processing procedures,
and design criteria; (4) faster permit decisions; (5) the appeal process;
and (6) problems with CEQA and NEPA.5 3 As suggested above, a one-
stop siting commission with the limitation on appeal discussed below
should take care of problems (4) and (5). The siting process is left to
deal with the remaining problems.
The Master Application
One of the distinguishing features of a one-stop industrial siting
program should be the master application form. The form should pro-
vide all of the information that normally would be required by each
agency that, but for the siting legislation, would have jurisdiction over
the project. With regard to the state resource agencies involved, each
agency should by now have published lists of its requirements, pursu-
ant to AB 884,54 which could be kept on file at the siting commission
office. With regard to county and city agencies, the applicant could be
required to specify those agencies that it believed would have jurisdic-
tion over the project but for the siting statute. After a review of this
designation, the siting agency would request that each affected local
agency, including any not listed by the applicant, prepare a list of the
information needed for a complete application. The local agency
would have a specified period, such as thirty days, within which to pro-
vide this information to the siting agency. Once submitted by the ap-
plicant, the completed application would be circulated to all affected
local and resource agencies. These agencies would have an additional
thirty days to request clarifying information consistent with their initial
information requests. After such time, the application would be
deemed complete.
Upon acceptance of the completed application, the time 'periods
specified in AB 884 would govern the preparation of the EIR.55 The
siting commission would be the lead agency 56 in the preparation of the
52. ASSOCIATION OF BAY AREA GOVERNMENTS, INDUSTRIAL SITING PILOT PROJECT
FINAL REPORT (1978).
53. Id. at 35.
54. Codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65950-65957.1 (West Supp. 1967-1979).
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65950-65957.1 (West Supp. 1967-1979).




Following completion of the application and certification of the
EIR, local and state resource agencies would have a limited period of
time, perhaps ninety days, to hold informational hearings and to make
specific recommendations for approval or disapproval of the project in-
cluding any required conditions on the proposed project. In the event
no recommendation were received within the ninety-day period, such
failure would be deemed an affirmative and unconditional recommen-
dation of the project by the local or resource agency. The local or re-
source agency could apply to the industrial siting commission for one
sixty-day extension of the ninety-day period, to be granted only for
good cause.
Experience has shown that a frequent perversion of legislative in-
tent is the extension of statutory deadlines. Applicants often may be
forced to agree to extensions under the threat of having a permit de-
nied. The purpose of requiring that the extension come from the siting
agency is to avoid putting the applicant in this situation. There should
be no right of appeal from the recommendations of the local or state
resource agencies because such recommendations are solely advisory.
Notably, the proceedings and actions of the local and state re-
source agencies must be consistent with those requirements of CEQA
which mandate that, where feasible, adverse consequences to the envi-
ronment must be mitigated.5 7 The siting proposal delineated in this
Article should not be inconsistent with CEQA in that regard.
Hearings before the industrial siting commission would commence
upon the receipt of all of the recommendations from the resource agen-
cies and should be completed within sixty days, but in any event prior
to expiration of the AB 884 time constraints.58 At the end of this pe-
riod, the industrial siting commission would issue a siting permit with
appropriate environmental and other conditions if the decision was in
favor of siting the proposed facility. If the decision were against the
application, the denial would be evidenced by a written order listing
the basis or bases for the denial. In either case the permit or decision
would be deposited with the legislature.
57. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21002.1 (West Supp. 1980) for CEQA's mitigation
measures.
58. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65950-65957.1 (West Supp. 1967-1979).
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Legislative Review
The legislature then would have sixty days from the date the deci-
sion or permit was deposited to act. In instances in which the siting
commission was proposing to grant the siting permit, the legislature
would have the following choices: (1) take no action, in which case the
permit would be deemed approved at the end of the sixty-day period;
(2) veto the permit, in which case the application would be deemed
denied and the siting commission could take no further action on the
application; or (3) conditionally approve the permit either by attaching
specific conditions, or by referring it back to the siting commission to
attach specific conditions consistent with general legislative directives.
In instances in which the siting commission was proposing to deny
a siting application, the legislature would have the following choices:
(1) take no action, in which case the denial would be deemed final at
the end of the sixty-day period; or (2) veto the siting commission's ac-
tion, in which case the siting commission would be required to submit
to the legislature within sixty days of such veto a form of siting permit
which they would find most acceptable under the circumstances. The
permit would then be subject to the same legislative review described
above for proposed permits.
The final right of approval for permits in this siting process thus
rests with the legislature and not with an administrative agency. The
siting legislation therefore should provide that there will be no right of
appeal from the legislative siting decision, except on constitutional
grounds.
Notice and Participation in Hearings
The procedural rules for the hearings conducted by the local and
resource agencies should be generally the same as those for any other
decision made by such agencies. Such local rules would govern notice
and participation before the agencies. The siting commission's rules
generally should be the same as those governing participation before
state administrative bodies in the exercise of their rule making powers.
Importantly, all persons interested in the siting decision should
have an opportunity to be heard without unduly delaying the siting
process. While California courts generally have been liberal in defin-
ing interested persons for the purposes of participation in administra-
tive proceedings, 59 in siting cases certain persons or entities should be
59. American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Procunier, 33 Cal. App. 3d 252, 109 Cal. Rptr.
22 (1973). See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 335.
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included specifically and given special notice and an opportunity to be
heard. These persons or entities would include all agencies and local
governments who normally would have permitting power over the pro-
posed facility as well as certain special interest groups, including envi-
ronmental and industrial groups. As in the case of zoning
amendments,60 contiguous landowners or landowners within a speci-
fied radius of the proposed facility also should be provided with spe-
cific notice and an opportunity to be heard. A streamlined industrial
siting process is not one intended to limit the right of any individual or
group to come forward and present its position; it is merely a process
whereby delaying or obfuscatory tactics can be eliminated.
Jurisdiction
The principle that should govern the jurisdiction of the industrial
siting commission is a simple one: only facilities that would have a
significant regional or statewide impact should be subject to the com-
mission's jurisdiction. Because there is undoubtedly a great deal of lat-
itude in deciding what objective standards will be used to decide which
facilities have a significant regional or statewide impact, the question of
jurisdiction is an important one. If the siting statute were applied too
broadly, it would unduly burden the siting commission, forcing it to
consider facilities that could more appropriately be decided on a local
basis. If the jurisdictional limits were drawn too narrowly, the whole
purpose of the agency would be frustrated. If recent history is any indi-
cation, there should be no more than a half dozen facilities a year that
ought to fall under the jurisdiction of the siting commission.
There are a number of factors that should be considered in defin-
ing jurisdiction. First, an absolute dollar amount may be a helpful
limit. For example, if the total construction costs of a project exceed a
certain dollar figure, such as $250,000,000, the project would come
within the jurisdiction of the commission, assuming it also met other
designated criteria.6'
Second, specified levels of pollutants emitted could be established
as criteria for the jurisdiction of the industrial siting commission.62 The
60. Horn v. Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 615, 596 P.2d 1134, 1139, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718, 723
(1979).
61. See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 325-28. While the figure of $250,000,000 is of
course somewhat arbitrary, the cost of a plant is a good indicator of its size, and hence in
many cases the impact on its surroundings.
62. For example, one might consider using process pounds per hour ratios, pounds or
tons per day of emissions of certain pollutants, the emission of certain hazardous wastes, or
other standards appearing to have a regionwide environmental impact.
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number of employees at a facility may be another relevant criterion.
This is particularly true where the facility is proposed to be located in
an area where a large number of new employees would have a dispro-
portionate impact on local populations.63 This criterion seems less im-
portant in a large industrial state such as California, but could be
important for certain of California's rural areas. A final factor may be
the type of industrial facility involved. The American Bar Association
Final Report by the Special Committee on Environmental Law notes that
because of their nature, such activities as oil refining, shale mining,
processing pulp mills, chemical manufacturing, and canneries may
warrant designation as major industrial facilities.64 As a practical mat-
ter, satisfactory criteria for the jurisdictional limits of an industrial sit-
ing act likely would include a combination of all of these factors.
Staffing and Funding
Consistent with the principle that an industrial siting agency
should not be a giant bureaucracy, the proposed siting agency should
maintain a minimum level of staffing and funding. This could be ac-
complished by delegating the basic information-gathering mechanisms
and many of the hearings and policing activities to the various state
and local resource agencies. This delegation would require only a min-
imal siting agency staff, sufficient to process a limited number of appli-
cations and to conduct the functions of a lead agency preparing an
EIR.
The funding of the industrial siting agency should come largely
from application fees. 65 The facilities coming under the jurisdiction of
the siting act will be extremely large; thus, not only should such
projects be able to afford application fees set at the approximate level
of the actual cost of processing the application, but payment of those
costs would also force each project to internalize the price of protecting
the environment from its impact. While the level of these fees is diffi-
cult to determine in advance, they probably would need to be in the
$200,000-$300,000 range to accomplish this goal. The applicant also
63. In drafting the Wyoming Industrial Siting Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-12-101 to 121
(1977), it was proposed, although later rejected, that any facility should fall under the Act
which employed the equivalent of over 1% or 11/% of the population of the county in which
the facility would be located.
64. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LEGAL
REFORMS TO FACILITATE INDUSTRIAL SITE SELECTION, FINAL REPORT BY THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58 (1974).
65. See Industrial Siting, supra note 1, at 330 & 330 n.133.
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would be required to pay as an additional fee all funds necessary to
prepare the environmental impact report.
Conclusion
The proposal outlined above suggests some substantial alterations
to existing siting practices. These suggestions may be viewed by some
as an attempt to make the siting process one which ensures the ap-
proval of major industrial facilities by avoiding careful consideration
of environmental issues. Although limitations on the number of fo-
rums and on judicial review are a part of this Article's proposal, there is
no intent to avoid or de-emphasize environmental issues. Indeed, the
proposal assumes that the CEQA requirements relating to mitigation of
impacts66 would be fully applicable.
To understand the proposal one only has to go back to the Sohio
example. 67 Industry and government spent five years looking at this
project and could come to no decision. Such a system is wasteful and
unacceptable. If society is to have an orderly system of resource use
and conservation, it needs both certainty as to timing and public ac-
countability of the decisionimakers. Hopefully this proposal achieves
these goals.
66. See CAL PUB. Ran. CODE § 21002.1 (West Supp. 1980).
67. See notes 2-9 & accompanying text supra.
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